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1  | INTRODUC TION
Scholars across the social sciences have debated whether or not peo-
ple with low social status are complicit in their oppression. On the one 
hand, unequal social systems tend to be relatively stable across time, 
suggesting some degree of passivity, if not complicity among the pop-
ulace; however, on the other hand, social movements aimed at dis-
rupting or altering social systems are often spearheaded by the very 
people disaffected by existing status arrangements. The status-legiti-
macy hypothesis (as coined by Brandt, 2013; Jost, Banaji, & 
Nosek, 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2003; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Ni 
Sullivan, 2003) predicts that people with lower status will, at least in 
some conditions, be more likely to see the social system as legitimate 
than people with higher status.1 In this article, we examine the condi-
tions under which this hypothesis finds support. We used a novel, 
30-country study on the association between subjective status and 
perceived legitimacy. We had two aims. First, we aimed to understand 
whether and when people with lower subjective status perceive 
higher levels of legitimacy than people with higher subjective status. 
Second, we aimed to understand what types of factors are associated 
with perceived legitimacy for people with low subjective status.
1.1 | Status-legitimacy hypothesis
The logic behind the status-legitimacy hypothesis is that people have 
motivations to see themselves, their groups, and their larger social 
systems in a positive light (for full details see Jost et al., 2003). For 
people with high social status, all of these motivations are generally 
consistent with one another; however, for people with low social 
status who are disadvantaged by the social system, seeing the self 
and one's group as positive conflicts with the motivation to see the 
social system as positive. To resolve this psychological conflict peo-
ple with low social status may, under some conditions, legitimize the 
social system more than people with high social status.
Scholars have debated the status-legitimacy hypothesis, testing 
the hypothesis several times with mixed results (find support: e.g., 
Henry & Saul, 2006; Li, Yang, Wu, & Kou, 2020; Sengupta, Osborne, & 
Sibley, 2015; see Jost, 2017 for a recent summary of relevant work; do 
not find support: e.g., Brandt, 2013; Caricati, 2017; Caricati & Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 2012; Vargas-Salfate, Paez, Liu, Pratto, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018; 
Zimmerman & Reyna, 2013). This work suggests that there is still 
broad scholarly interest in how status and legitimacy are related. We 
aim to add two things to this literature. With Approach 1, we test po-
tential individual- and societal-level moderators of the associations 
between different levels of subjective status and perceived legitimacy 
(i.e., a relative focus). Under what conditions and among people with 
what kinds of perceptions and psychological characteristics is there 
evidence for the status-legitimacy hypothesis (cf. McGuire, 2013)? 
With Approach 2, we focus on people with low levels of social sta-
tus and tested potential predictors of perceived legitimacy among 
this group. Unlike the first approach, Approach 2 does not focus on 
whether the predictors differ from people with high levels of status.
1.2 | Approach 1: Testing 
moderators of the association between subjective 
status and perceived legitimacy
The status-legitimacy hypothesis follows from the idea that peo-
ple are addressing the threatening feelings of aversive anxiety and 
arousal resulting from psychological conflict. People alter their 
 1A related hypothesis predicts that lower power will be associated with higher levels of 
perceived legitimacy (van der Toorn et al., 2015). Our data also test this hypothesis; 
however, to sharpen the focus of the manuscript at the request of reviewers we have 
moved the power related analyses and discussion to supplemental materials.
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Abstract
The relationships between subjective status and perceived legitimacy are important 
for understanding the extent to which people with low status are complicit in their 
oppression. We use novel data from 66 samples and 30 countries (N = 12,788) and 
find that people with higher status see the social system as more legitimate than 
those with lower status, but there is variation across people and countries. The asso-
ciation between subjective status and perceived legitimacy was never negative at any 
levels of eight moderator variables, although the positive association was sometimes 
reduced. Although not always consistent with hypotheses, group identification, self-
esteem, and beliefs in social mobility were all associated with perceived legitimacy 
among people who have low subjective status. These findings enrich our understand-
ing of the relationship between social status and legitimacy.
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behaviors, beliefs, and perceptions in order to address this threat, 
and when the feelings of threat are assuaged they are less likely to 
alter their behaviors, beliefs, and perceptions (for reviews see Jonas 
et al., 2014; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Factors that 
make social hierarchy appear less consequential in material or psy-
chological terms (we discuss several factors below) should reduce 
the effects of low subjective status on the anxious arousal that 
results from status-based dissonance. Therefore, this reasoning 
suggests that when people's feelings of threat are addressed, the 
status-legitimacy link will be positive (i.e., low status people will be 
less inclined to legitimize the system as a way to assuage feelings of 
threat). Conversely, when people's anxious arousal is exacerbated, 
the status-legitimacy link will be negative (i.e., low status people will 
see the system as more legitimate).
1.2.1 | Moderators that reduce threat
There are potentially many factors that can mitigate anxious 
arousal. We focus on factors that have appeared in the system 
justification and social identity literatures because these litera-
tures have been the focus of debates on this issue (for a recent 
example see Jost, 2019; Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2019). The 
most obvious factor is the identification with and salience of a val-
ued group, which is one way social identity theorists suggest peo-
ple address anxious arousal (Hogg, 2014) or cope with the threat 
of having a low status (McMahon & Watts, 2002; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Consistent with this, the original paper proposing 
the status-legitimacy hypothesis argued that if group interests are 
salient and accessible (something that is likely to be correlated 
with identification), then support for the status-legitimacy hy-
pothesis is unlikely to emerge (Jost et al., 2003, 2004). Similarly, 
people with high self-esteem and positive self-views make plans, 
have high levels of personal agency, and high levels of self-cer-
tainty (e.g., Campbell, 1990; Harter, 1978), suggesting that they 
are less likely to be psychologically affected by uncontrollability 
and similar types of threats associated with low status (see Laurin, 
Kay, & Landau, 2018 or Schoel, Bluemke, Mueller, & Stahlberg, 
2011 for a similar argument in different domains). This is consist-
ent with the idea that self-esteem should push against system jus-
tification motivations for low status people (cf. Jost, Gaucher, & 
Stern, 2015, p. 330).2
1.2.2 | Structural moderators that increase threat 
through dissonance
Other factors can exacerbate feelings of anxious arousal by in-
creasing the amount of dissonance people experience. The 
most direct prediction comes from assessing the contradictory 
cognitions that could increase dissonance. The dissonance that 
people experience from being in a low status position might 
emerge “from the contradictory cognitions that (a) the system 
is putting me (and my group) at a disadvantage, and (b) through 
our acquiescence, my group and I are contributing to the stability 
of the system” (Jost et al., 2003, p. 16). Therefore, people who 
recognize that they are not doing enough to mitigate inequality 
should experience more dissonance. This recognition should in-
crease perceived legitimacy for people who are low status and is 
part of the contradictory cognitions originally predicted to cause 
lower status people to see the system as more legitimate than 
higher status people do.
The amount of civil liberties, meritocratic culture, and in-
equality within a country could also affect feelings of disso-
nance. Countries and contexts with more civil liberties and more 
meritocratic cultures increase the amount of dissonance peo-
ple low in status experience by implying they have choice and 
control over their outcomes (Jost et al., 2003, p. 17). Inequality 
may increase the conflict between self/group motivations and 
acceptance of the system for low status group members (e.g., 
Henry & Saul, p. 376). It may also create the impression that 
people have less control over their place within society. Both 
factors should increase the amount of anxious uncertainty 
and increase the necessity of rationalizing the system. No 
support was found for these predictions in some prior studies 
(Brandt, 2013; Caricati, 2017; Caricati & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2012; 
Trump & White, 2018; for one exception on one measure see 
Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018).
1.2.3 | Structural moderators that affect threat
Structural factors, including levels of inequality or the stability 
of the hierarchy, influence what types of options people per-
ceive that they have and their place within the society. These 
perceptions may affect people's perceptions of the whole sys-
tem. For example, to the extent that inequality exacerbates 
feelings of hierarchy and the threatening feelings of low status, 
as well as making status differences more salient, this should 
further motivate challenges to the inequality by the low status 
group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This is the opposite of the inequal-
ity prediction above. When looking at the stability of the hierar-
chy, one of the traditional predictions of social identity theory 
is that low status group members are less likely to seek social 
change when the status hierarchy is perceived as stable, com-
pared to when the hierarchy is perceived as unstable (Ellemers, 
van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). That 
is, when the status hierarchy is stable, there is little scope and 
hope for social change (i.e., no cognitive alternative to the sta-
tus quo), and people are more likely to accept the system as 
legitimate. This hypothesis is also consistent with work finding 
that system stability increases a system justification motivation 
(Laurin, Gaucher, & Kay, 2013).
 2Social identity theory and system justification theory have also both used self-esteem 
as an outcome variable. Although this is interesting, it is not the focus of our 
investigation.
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1.2.4 | Summary
We have identified several potential moderators that might help us 
predict when we are more or less likely to find support for the sta-
tus-legitimacy hypothesis. These moderators are expressed as indi-
vidual hypotheses in Table 1. In the cross-national study that follows, 
we test these eight hypotheses.
1.3 | Approach 2: Finding the predictors of 
perceived legitimacy for people with lower levels of 
subjective status
In addition to searching for moderators, we also ask what pre-
dicts perceived legitimacy for people with low levels of social 
status. Put another way, assuming that people with low levels of 
Variable Moderator hypothesis
Reduce threat
Group Identification Identification-Moderation Hypothesis: The link between status and 
legitimacy will be negative for people low in group identification 
and positive for people high in group identification.
Self-Esteem Self-Esteem-Moderation Hypothesis: The link between status and 
legitimacy will be negative for people low in self-esteem and 
positive for people high in self-esteem.
Increase threat through dissonance
Inequality contribution Inequality Contribution-Moderation Hypothesis: The link between 
status and legitimacy will be negative for people who see 
themselves as contributing to inequality and positive for people 
who do not see themselves as contributing to inequality.
Civil Liberties Civil Liberties Hypothesis: The link between status and legitimacy 
will be negative in countries with high levels of civil liberties and 
positive for people in countries with low levels of civil liberties.
Meritocracy Meritocracy Hypothesis: The link between status and legitimacy will 
be negative in countries with meritocratic cultures and positive for 
people in countries with less meritocratic cultures.
Inequality System Justification Theory (SJT) Inequality Hypothesis: The link 
between status and legitimacy will be negative in countries with 
high levels of inequality and positive for people in countries with 
low levels of inequality.
Structural Factors That Affect Threat
Inequality Social Identity Theory (SIT) Inequality Hypothesis: The link between 
status and legitimacy will be negative in countries with low levels 
of inequality and positive for people in countries with high levels of 
inequality.
Stability Stability-Moderator Hypothesis: The link between status and 
legitimacy will be negative when people see the status hierarchy 
as stable and positive when people see the status hierarchy as 
unstable.
TA B L E  1   Summary of the moderator 
hypotheses tested in this investigation 
(Approach 1)
Variable Predictor hypothesis
Social mobility Social Mobility-Legitimacy Hypothesis: People with 
low status who see the system as having high social 
mobility will be more likely to see the system as 
legitimate.
Stability Stability-Legitimacy Hypothesis: People with low status 
who see the status hierarchy as stable will be more 
likely to see the system as legitimate.
Identification Identification-Legitimacy Hypothesis: People with low 
status who have high group identification will be less 
likely to see the system as legitimate.
Self-esteem Self-Esteem Legitimacy Hypothesis: People with low 
status who have high self-esteem will be less likely to 
see the system as legitimate.
TA B L E  2   Summary of the predictor 
hypotheses tested in this investigation 
(Approach 2)
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subjective status vary in the extent to which they see the system 
as legitimate, what predicts this variation? In contrast to the prior 
section, this line of questioning does not necessarily imply mod-
eration effects, as the predictors of perceived legitimacy for lower 
status groups could be the same as the predictors of perceived 
legitimacy for higher status groups (moderation is possible, but 
not necessary). This approach moves away from the explicit status 
comparisons of the status-legitimacy hypothesis and is consistent 
with the broader questions that inspired this hypothesis: Do peo-
ple see systems that oppress them as just and legitimate, and if so 
under what conditions? We focus on four different variables that 
might predict perceived legitimacy for people with lower levels of 
social status (see Table 2).
Some work suggests that people desire to live in social systems 
in which there is upward mobility and the system is relatively stable 
(Laurin et al., 2013; Martorana, Galinsky, & Rao, 2005). Consistent 
with this, people who perceived no possibilities to move up to a higher 
status group are less likely to justify the system and more likely to 
engage in collective action (Day & Fiske, 2017; Ellemers et al., 1990; 
Mandisodza, Jost, & Unzueta, 2006; Tajfel, 1981; Wright, Taylor, & 
Moghaddam, 1990). Similarly, systems with more stable social hier-
archies are seen as more legitimate (Laurin et al., 2013) and are less 
likely to trigger efforts to change the system (Bettencourt, Charlton, 
Dorr, & Hume, 2001; Ellemers et al., 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This 
suggests that when people see the system as providing social mobil-
ity and stability, they are more likely to see the system as legitimate.
When people's group- and self-interests are prioritized, it 
may be less likely that people perceive the system as legitimate 
if they or their group are not benefitting from that system. That 
is, higher levels of group identification and self-esteem may both 
be associated with lower levels of perceived system legitimacy 
among people with low social status. This follows from the idea 
that group- and self-interest motivations are negatively related 
to system-related motivations among low status groups (Jost 
et al., 2004). It is also consistent with the idea that the effects of 
group- and self-interests—when sufficiently strong—may be more 
prominent than the effects of system-interests (Jost et al., 2003, 
2004, 2011) and with the finding that people with low levels of 
group identification may be more likely to accept the current situ-
ation (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004; Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). 
According to these ideas, people with lower subjective status who 
have high group identification or who have high self-esteem will 
be less likely to see the system as legitimate.
From our reading of the literature, the predictions in the prior 
paragraph seem most consistent with a straightforward extension 
of social identity theory's work on group identification to research 
on perceived legitimacy. However, it is important to note that recent 
work by some scholars (and co-authors of this article) has predicted 
the opposite, at least as a function of an additional qualifier. A series 
of papers by Owuamalam and colleagues have argued that high group 
identifiers and people under conditions of high group salience may 
be likely to see the system as legitimate to the extent that it is seen as 
one that affords the group collective social mobility in the long term and 
allows them to eventually achieve social change as a group (e.g., due 
to longer-term status instability; Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2016, 
2019; Owuamalam, Rubin, Spears, & Weerabangsa, 2017; for a 
countervailing view see Jost, 2019). In short, using the system rather 
than rejecting it, can be seen as a viable vehicle for group interests, 
especially for high identifiers. This idea can also be tested with our 
data and essentially predicts the opposite of the predictions in the 
prior paragraph.
1.3.1 | Summary
We identified several potential predictors of perceived legitimacy 
for people with lower social status that might help us understand 
the reasons some people with low social status perceive the social 
system as legitimate. Some predictors indicate that the system is ful-
filling the person's goals and other predictors indicate that personal 
and group goals are prioritized. These hypotheses are specified indi-
vidually in Table 2. In the cross-national study that follows, we test 
these four hypotheses.
1.4 | An international, multi-lab approach
We conducted a cross-country study on the association between 
subjective status and perceived legitimacy that allowed us to test 
for moderators of the status-legitimacy relationships, as well as to 
understand what predicts perceived legitimacy for people with 
lower levels of subjective status.3 We consider three types of 
effects:
To assess moderators (Approach 1):
1. We test the interactions between status and the 
proposed moderator variables. If the interaction is 
significant, we test whether the effect of subjective 
status is negative (consistent with the status-legiti-
macy hypothesis) at the predicted levels of the mod-
erator variables (e.g., when identification is low).
The assessment of predictors of perceived legitimacy among peo-
ple with low status will take two steps (Approach 2):
2a. We examine the main effects of the predictors on 
perceived legitimacy. Because the hypotheses about 
 3Recently, system justification theorists have proposed that a low sense of power, rather 
than status, is associated with greater perceived legitimacy. Whereas status indicates the 
amount of prestige and respect a person or group is accorded in the system, power 
indicates the amount of control a person has over valued resources (Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). Trusting and legitimizing outside sources of control (e.g., governments) 
can help restore people's sense of control, something that is lacking with low feelings of 
power (van der Toorn et al., 2015; cf. Friesen et al., 2014; Kay et al., 2008). By perceiving 
the system as legitimate, people with low feelings of power can regain some feelings of 
control. We therefore simultaneously tested all hypotheses for interpersonal sense of 
power. Complete results are in the supplemental materials.
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predictors of perceived legitimacy are not specific to 
people with lower levels of subjective status (e.g., social 
mobility could predict perceived legitimacy for people 
with both high and low status), this main effect analysis 
tells us if there is an average effect across the sample.
2b. When there is a significant interaction between 
the predictor and status, we examine whether the 
predictor still has the predicted significant effect 
(e.g., a positive effect of social mobility) for people 
with lower levels of status. This will tell us whether 
the effect of the predictor is specific to people with 
low subjective status.
2  | METHOD
2.1 | Participants and procedure
Sixty-six distinct samples were collected by researchers from 30 coun-
tries. We aimed for 150 participants per sample, so that we had at 
least 150 participants per country to give us approximately 80% 
power to detect a small to medium effect (i.e., r = .22) within each 
sample. Data collection was not continued after analysis. To ensure 
that respondents were part of the social and political system, we only 
included participants who indicated they were either born in the coun-
try or had lived in the country for six or more years and so not every 
sample resulted in 150 participants.4 All exclusions are reported. 
Countries, samples, type of sample, proportion of men, mean age, and 
sample size are presented in Table 3. Samples included a mix of stu-
dent samples, community samples, and samples with both students 
and members of the community (the latter two were both considered 
non-student samples for the sake of analyses). Samples are primarily 
samples of university students, although some include community 
samples from Mechanical Turk (USA2), community email lists (e.g., 
USA6), or a representative sample (NLD3). Multiple samples per coun-
try helps guard against the possibility that results for any particular 
country are dependent on one particular sample. Research was con-
ducted in accordance with APA and national guidelines. Data, code, 
and materials are available at the following link: https://osf.io/5uxc7 /.
Participating labs used materials designed by the first three au-
thors. These labs translated the materials and adjusted them when 
necessary for their language and cultural context (e.g., replacing 
“United States” in the system justification measure). Participants 
first completed measures of demographics, including the measure 
of subjective social status. They then completed measures about 
either their perceptions of themselves and their group's position in 
society (the moderators and predictors) or their perceptions of sys-
tem legitimacy (the outcomes). The supplemental materials include 
a list of all measures and manipulations. Analyses include partici-
pants who are over 18 and have completed at least the subjective 
status and the system justification, trust in government, confidence 
in societal institutions, and legitimacy of the status hierarchy mea-
sures. The final sample included 12,788 participants (4,252 men, 
8,478 women, 58 with missing responses, Mage = 25.3, SDage = 10.7).
2.2 | Key predictor variable: subjective status
To measure subjective social status, we used the MacArthur Scale of 
Subjective Social Status (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000), 
modified to capture people's sense of status within their country. 
We chose this measure to allow easier comparisons across countries. 
Participants were asked to rate themselves on a ladder that ranged 
from 1 to 10, where 10 was high status and 1 was low status. The 
instructions for the measure read as follows:
Think of this ladder as representing where people 
stand in [country]. At the top of the ladder are people 
who are the best off—those who have the most money, 
the most education, and the most respected jobs. At 
the bottom are the people who are the worst off—who 
have the least money, least education, and the least re-
spected jobs or no job. The higher up you are on this 
ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very 
top; the lower you are, the closer you are to the people 
at the very bottom. Please choose the number of the 
rung of the ladder where you think you stand at this 
time in your life, relatively to other people in [country].
This one-item measure had adequate test-retest reliability in prior 
samples (e.g., Operario, Adler, & Williams, 2004) and is correlated 
with objective measures of status (e.g., income; Goodman et al., 2003; 
Sakurai, Kawakami, Yamaoka, Ishikawa, & Hashimoto, 2010). Responses 
in our sample were above the midpoint (M = 6.03, SD = 1.53), but spanned 
the entire range of the measure. See supplemental materials for means 
across countries on this and all other individual-level variables.
2.3 | Key outcome variable: perceived legitimacy
We included four measures of perceived legitimacy and system justifi-
cation. Multiple research groups studying the status-legitimacy hypoth-
esis have used all these measures (e.g., Brandt, 2013; Henry & 
Saul, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Li et al., 2020). The 8-item general system 
justification scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) includes items like “In general, I find 
society to be fair” and “Society is set up so that people usually get what 
they deserve” (M α = .78, SD α = .06, α range [.66, .85]; Scale M = −0.64; 
Scale SD = 1.14; −3 = Disagree strongly to +3 = Agree strongly).5
 4Six or more years was chosen to ensure that participants who were international or 
exchange students were not included in the sample.
 5For each scale, alpha or the correlation coefficient (for 2-item scales) was calculated in 
each country separately. Mean, standard deviation, and range of alphas and correlation 
coefficients across countries are reported in the text.
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TA B L E  3   Sample demographic information. Sorted in alphabetical order by country
Sample Country Type
Proportion 
Male M age N
AUS1 Australia Student 0.27 21.4 209
AUS2 Australia Student 0.34 19.5 114
AUS3 Australia Student 0.34 19.2 80
AUS4 Australia Student 0.29 20.1 163
AUS5 Australia Student 0.32 23.2 222
BEL1 Belgium Student 0.35 20.0 623
BEL2 Belgium Student 0.54 21.7 137
BEL3 Belgium Student 0.28 19.3 194
BEL4 Belgium Student 0.24 21.9 91
CAN1 Canada Student 0.33 18.7 180
CHL1 Chile Student 0.28 20.9 156
COL1 Colombia Student 0.27 19.9 139
CZE1 Czech Republic Non-Student 0.23 27.5 154
CZE2 Czech Republic Non-Student 0.29 23.7 241
CZE3 Czech Republic Non-Student 0.30 24.8 311
DNK1 Denmark Student 0.16 24.0 162
FRA1 France Student 0.31 21.2 303
FRA2 France Student 0.11 20.8 163
FRA3 France Student 0.46 18.6 180
DEU1 Germany Student 0.36 25.3 50
DEU2 Germany Student 0.18 22.6 133
DEU3 Germany Student 0.22 22.7 151
DEU4 Germany Non-Student 0.81 37.2 89
GBR1 Great Britain Student 0.14 19.8 213
GBR2 Great Britain Student 0.07 19.1 138
GBR3 Great Britain Student 0.18 19.6 169
GBR4 Great Britain Student 0.08 19.1 118
GRC1 Greece Non-Student 0.49 35.9 444
HUN1 Hungary Student 0.22 20.2 144
IND1 India Non-Student 0.74 31.2 449
IRL1 Ireland Student 0.46 24.6 145
ITA1 Italy Student 0.47 43.0 103
ITA2 Italy Student 0.47 44.0 103
ITA3 Italy Student 0.05 26.9 109
LBN1 Lebanon Student 0.51 18.9 204
MYS1 Malaysia Student 0.43 20.8 146
MYS2 Malaysia Non-Student 0.44 24.6 63
NLD1 Netherlands Student 0.26 19.8 184
NLD2 Netherlands Student 0.19 20.0 232
NLD3 Netherlands Non-Student 0.49 40.4 766
NLD4 Netherlands Student 0.20 21.2 176
NZL1 New Zealand Student 0.18 21.0 180
POL1 Poland Student 0.16 28.0 214
POL2 Poland Non-Student 0.20 23.2 160
(Continues)
     |  9SUBJECTIVE STATUS AND PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY
The 4-item trust in government scale often included in the 
American National Election Studies (2015; cf. Brandt, 2013) in-
cludes items like “How much of the time do you think you can trust 
the government to do what is right?” (1 = None of the time, 2 = Some 
of the time, 3 = Most of the time, 4 = Just about always) and “Would 
you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the 
people?” (1 = Few big interests, 2 = Benefit of all). Items were first 
standardized using z-scores and then averaged to form a scale (M 
α = .61, SD α = .17, α range [−.10, .78,]; Scale M = −0.02; Scale 
SD = 0.75).6
The 7-item measure assessing confidence in societal institu-
tions adopted from the General Social Survey (2017), and used 
in Brandt (2013), was used to tap into perceptions of both gov-
ernmental and economic systems. For each of seven institutions, 
participants are asked how much confidence they have in them 
(0 = None at all, 3 = A great deal). Institutions include the armed 
forces, the police, the courts, the governments of the country, 
congress, major companies, and banks and financial institutions 
(M α = .77, SD α = .04, α range [.63, .83,]; Scale M = 1.35; Scale 
SD = 0.55).
Finally, a 2-item measure of the perceived legitimacy of the status 
hierarchy was used to capture perceived legitimacy in this specific 
domain (based on Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). The 
items were prefaced with “Differences in power and status between 
groups in [country] are...” and then participants rated the stems “…
illegitimate” and “…unfair” on a scale ranging from −3 = Disagree 
strongly to 3 = Agree strongly (M r = .52, SD r = .14, r range [.33, .80]; 
Scale M = −0.83; Scale SD = 1.30). These items were measured in 
the same block of questions as the stability of the status hierarchy 
measure (see below).
2.4 | Individual level measures of 
moderators and predictors
2.4.1 | Group identification
We measured group identification with a three-item scale about 
participants’ identification with their social class. The scale was 
prefaced with, “The following questions are about people with a 
similar background and social class as yourself. Social class refers 
to people with similar opportunities in terms of income, education, 
and social standing, as in the ladder measure that you completed 
earlier.” The items were “I identify with people from my social 
 6The negative α (−.06) for the trust in government scale is found in Russia. The next 
lowest α is .20 in Lebanon.
Sample Country Type
Proportion 
Male M age N
POL3 Poland Non-Student 0.65 26.4 166
RUS1 Russia Student 0.34 19.4 117
SRB1 Serbia Student 0.24 20.3 159
SRB2 Serbia Non-Student 0.39 30.7 173
SGP1 Singapore Student 0.27 19.9 196
SVK1 Slovakia Student 0.19 22.6 268
SVK2 Slovakia Non-Student 0.49 46.7 166
KOR1 South Korea Student 0.30 20.6 119
ESP1 Spain Student 0.24 23.1 148
ESP2 Spain Student 0.30 32.7 252
CHE1 Switzerland Student 0.51 20.3 131
TUR1 Turkey Student 0.30 20.5 122
TUR2 Turkey Student 0.23 20.0 99
USA1 United States Student 0.20 20.6 224
USA2 United States Non-Student 0.57 35.1 214
USA3 United States Student 0.42 19.8 316
USA4 United States Student 0.27 19.9 195
USA5 United States Student 0.17 19.4 181
USA6 United States Non-Student 0.23 36.1 368
USA7 United States Non-Student 0.48 41.5 116
URY1 Uruguay Student 0.28 22.2 169
URY2 Uruguay Student 0.21 20.6 184
TA B L E  3   (Continued)
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class”, “I feel solidarity with my social class”, and “My social class 
is an important part of how I see myself”. Participants responded 
to these items on a scale ranging from −3 = Disagree strongly to 
3 = Agree strongly (M α = .67, SD α = .10, α range [.38, .78]; Scale 
M = 0.51; Scale SD = 1.17).
2.4.2 | Self-esteem
We measured self-esteem with the validated single-item measure 
(Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). This measure reads “I have 
high self-esteem” with answers that ranged from 0 = Not at all to 
6 = Very true of me (Item M = 3.50; Item SD = 1.57).
2.4.3 | Social mobility
We measured perceptions of social mobility with six items. They 
included, “In general, people can easily get ahead in society”, “In 
general, people can climb the social ladder and be successful”, 
“People with a similar background and social class to my own can 
easily get ahead in society”, “It is easy for people with a similar 
background and social class to my own to climb the social ladder 
and be successful”, “I am motivated to climb up the social ladder”, 
and “I am able to climb up the social ladder”. All items were meas-
ure on a scale ranging from −3 = Disagree strongly to 3 = Agree 
strongly and had good reliability (M α = .72, SD α = .06, α range [.52, 
.81]; Scale M = 0.82; Scale SD = 0.93).
2.4.4 | Contribute to inequality
We created five items to measure whether people felt that they 
contributed to inequality and the stability of the system. One item, 
“I could do more to change differences in power and status between 
groups in society”, did not correlate as expected with the other items 
and substantially reduced the reliability of the scale (α = .58), so we 
omitted it. The remaining four items read “I contribute to keeping 
society the way it is”, “I contribute to maintaining the current social 
hierarchy”, “I don't do anything to change the current differences 
in power and status in society”, and “I am not trying to change the 
current differences in power and status in society”. All items were 
measured on a scale ranging from −3 = Disagree strongly to 3 = Agree 
strongly and the four remaining items created a reliable scale (M α = 
.71, SD α = .09, α range [.46, .84]; Scale M = −0.14; Scale SD = 1.12).
2.4.5 | Stability of the status hierarchy
We used a 2-item measure of the perceived stability of the status 
hierarchy. This was based on measures used in studies from a so-
cial identity perspective (Mummendey et al., 1999). The items 
were prefaced with “Differences in power and status between 
groups in [country] are...” and then participants rated the stems “…
difficult to change” and “…will remain stable over time” on a scale 
ranging from −3 = Disagree strongly to 3 = Agree strongly (M r = .31, 
SD r = .14, r range [−.06, .76]; Scale M = 0.82; Scale SD = 1.14).7
2.5 | Societal level measures of moderators
We included three measures to assess societal level conditions. 
To capture the amount of civil liberties, we used the 2015 Civil 
Liberties subscale of the Democracy index created by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2016). This index uses a combination of survey 
data and expert ratings to estimate how democratically free indi-
vidual countries are. It has been used in prior work testing similar 
questions (Brandt, 2013).
To assess the extent to which the culture holds meritocratic val-
ues, we combined four items from international surveys. The first two 
are the importance of ambition and hard work for getting ahead in 
life in the ISSP (2009). The third and fourth come from the sixth wave 
of the World Values Survey (2016). The third asks participants to re-
spond to an item ranging from 1 = “Competition is good. It stimulates 
people to work hard and develop new ideas” to 10 = “Competition 
is harmful. It brings out the worst in people”. The fourth asks partic-
ipants to respond to an item ranging from 1 = “In the long run, hard 
work usually brings better life” to 10 = “Hard work doesn't generally 
bring success—it's more a matter of luck and connections”. All four 
items were standardized, the third and fourth items were reverse 
scored, and all four items were combined to form a scale (α = .82).
To measure the objective inequality, we used the Gini index 
from 2013 and obtained from the World Bank (World Bank, 2016). 
For some countries, the 2013 data were not available, and in 
these cases the most recent data were included instead. The Gini 
index assesses the amount of income inequality within a region, 
with higher scores indicating greater inequality. It is a common 
measure of inequality within a society (e.g., Oishi, Kesebir, & 
Diener, 2011).
2.6 | Covariates
We included three covariates for analyses that focused on the 
individual level: self-reported age, gender (0 = women, 1 = men), 
and type of sample (0 = student, 1 = non-student) to adjust for 
potential background influences. For the models that include pre-
dictors at the societal level of analysis, we included two country-
level covariates. We included the GDP per capita for each of the 
countries to control for overall wealth (World Bank, 2016). To 
control for broader regional trends (Kuppens & Pollet, 2014), we 
also included contrast codes for each of the continents repre-
sented in our data.
 7The negative correlation (−.06) between the stability items is found in Malaysia. The 
next lowest correlation is .18 in Canada.
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2.7 | A note on coding
We coded all of the variables to range from 0 to 1. Multilevel regression 
coefficients are then the proportion difference in the outcome variable as 
one goes from 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum) on the predictor variable. For 
example, a coefficient of .05 is a 5% difference in the outcome between 
people scoring the lowest and the highest on the predictor variable.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Preliminary analyses: the effects of subjective 
status on perceived legitimacy
We use multilevel models to account for participants’ nesting within coun-
tries and within samples/labs. Models were estimated using lme4 (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2016) packages in R (R Core Team, 2016). Because we are 
interested in the individual-level association between subjective status 
and perceived legitimacy, we centered subjective status at the country-
mean (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). The correlations between the predictor 
variables and the measures of perceived legitimacy are in Figure 1 (created 
with GGally, Schloerke et al., 2016). The measures of system justification, 
trust, confidence, and legitimacy of the status hierarchy were moderately 
inter-correlated (M α = .70, SD α = .06, α range [.56, .82]). To combine items, 
reduce the overall number of models, and facilitate generalization across 
measures, we nested these four measures within participants, resulting in 
a four-level multilevel model: legitimacy measures nested in persons, 
nested in samples/labs, nested in countries. In short, this estimates the 
average effect across multiple measures of system legitimacy that have 
been used in the literature, while increasing measurement precision (see 
for similar suggestions, Gelman, 2018; McShane, Tackett, Böckenholt, & 
Gelman, 2019). It is analogous to conducting four studies and estimating 
the meta-analytic estimate across the four studies.8
First, we tested the main effect of subjective status on per-
ceived legitimacy. This test conceptually replicates many prior 
tests of these hypotheses (e.g., Brandt, 2013; Henry & Saul, 2006; 
Jost et al., 2003). We regressed perceived legitimacy on coun-
try-mean-centered subjective status. We also included coun-
try-mean-centered sense of power in this analysis and all other 
analyses because it was part of our original analysis plan (see 
Appendix S1). People with higher subjective status are more likely to 
see the social system as legitimate compared to people with lower 
subjective status (b = .152, SE = 0.005, 95% CI [0.142, 0.162]). There 
is a 15% difference in perceived legitimacy between people with the 
highest and people with the lowest levels of subjective status. This 
is in contrast to the prediction of the status-legitimacy hypothesis.
To test whether these results are impacted by covariates, we in-
cluded age (country-mean-centered), gender (country-mean-centered), 
type of sample (grand mean-centered), and the type of perceived legiti-
macy measure (contrast coded) as covariates, including the interactions 
between these contrast codes and status and sense of power.9 This gives 
us the average effect of the primary predictors across the four measures 
of perceived legitimacy and controls for mean differences between the 
measures. The estimate for subjective status is nearly identical to the 
estimate without covariates (b = .151, SE = 0.005, 95% CI [0.141, 0.161]).10
The effect of subjective status is not the same across all people 
in all situations. We re-estimated the model with covariates and in-
cluded random slopes at the country-level for subjective status and 
sense of power. The estimated slope of subjective status on perceived 
legitimacy for each of the countries is in Figure 2. Although the effect 
of subjective status is always estimated to be positive when predict-
ing perceived legitimacy, it varies in size. In the next section of the 
article, we consider moderators of the effects of subjective status.
3.2 | Approach 1: Moderators of subjective status 
on perceived legitimacy
We tested individual-level moderators and country-level modera-
tors. Individual level moderators were country-mean-centered and 
included in separate models as fixed effects in the four-level multi-
level model used above (see Figure 3 for correlations between 
these measures).11 We built the country-level models using the 
same four-level multilevel models, with the addition of the coun-
try-level moderators and country-level covariates.12 All country-
level variables were grand-mean-centered, with the exception of 
the contrast codes for continents.13 In the country-level models, 
 8We also conducted the analyses with only the system justification scale because this 
scale is perhaps the most well-developed of the four scales and it was reliable in all of the 
countries. Conclusions in the main text are essentially unchanged. There are two 
exceptions. The negative interaction between stability and status was negative and 
non-significant and the positive interaction between civil liberties and status was 
positive and non-significant when only looking at the system justification scale. 
Importantly, the sizes of these coefficients were very similar to the coefficients in the 
models including all legitimacy measures, suggesting that the reduction in error variance 
when using additional data is the reason for the different conclusions when using all 
legitimacy measures or only the system justification scale.
 9We used the simr package in R (Green & MacLeod, 2016) to see how much power our 
model and sample size had to detect the effects of subjective status when b = .01, .02, 
.05, and .10. These analyses showed that we had adequate power to detect effects of at 
least .02 (i.e. a 2% difference in the outcome variable between the minimum and 
maximum of the predictor variable; power ≈ 49%, 97%, 100%, 100% respectively).
 10The variance for the intercept at each level of the multilevel models that included covariates 
was also calculated (Participants σ = .049, Labs σ = .006, Countries σ = .098, Residual σ = .18). 
Descriptively, there is more variation between countries than there is between labs.
 11We used the simr package in R (Green & MacLeod, 2016) to see how much power our model 
and sample size had to detect individual-level interaction effects when b = .02, .05, .10, and 
.20. We used the model with the identification moderator as our base model for these 
analyses. These analyses showed that we had adequate power to detect moderation effects of 
at least .10 (i.e., a .10 difference in the unstandardized slope of status/power at the minimum 
and maximum of the moderator variable; power ≈12%, 46%, 98%, 100% respectively).
 12We used the simr package in R (Green & MacLeod, 2016) to see how much power our 
model and sample size had to detect country-level interaction effects for both subjective 
status and sense of power when b = .01, .02, .05, .10, and .20 We used the model with 
the meritocracy moderator as our base model for these analyses. These analyses showed 
that we had adequate power to detect country-level moderation effects of at least .20 
(power ≈6%, 10%, 45%, 87% respectively).
 13To check the robustness of our results to outliers at the country-level (cf. Ullrich, & 
Schlüter, 2012), we visually inspected histograms of the country-level predictors. There 
were clear outliers for both the Gini index and the measure of civil liberties. These 
models were run both with and without outliers. All models are in the figures 
summarizing results and the primary models discussed in the text include all data.
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we included random slopes for subjective status and sense of 
power.
To interpret the interactions, we used marginal effects plots cre-
ated with interplot (Solt & Hu, 2015). This plots the marginal effect 
(sometimes called the simple effect) of the predictor variable for the 
entire range of the moderator variable. This helps us to understand 
the effect across the range of the moderator variables, rather than 
only focusing on points ±1 SD of the mean of the moderator variable 
(cf. Aiken & West, 1991). We also included a histogram of the mod-
erator variable in each plot to illustrate how much of the sample is 
located at different levels of the moderator variable (cf. Hainmueller, 
Mummolo, & Xu, 2019).
F I G U R E  1   Correlations (above the diagonal) and density plots (below the diagonal) between subjective status, sense of power, and the 
outcome variables. All variables were country-mean-centered before calculating the correlations. Density plots for each individual variable 
are on the diagonal. Density plots are a variant of a histogram. The area below the diagonal uses density plots between two variables. 
SJ = System Justification, Trust = Trust in Government, Confid = Confidence in Societal Institutions, Legit = Legitimacy of the status 
hierarchy
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3.2.1 | Moderators that reduce threat
We tested the hypotheses that are based on the assumption that 
group identification and self-esteem reduce the experience of 
threat. If the hypotheses are supported, we should find positive in-
teractions between the moderators and status, such that at high lev-
els of the moderator variables the link between status and perceived 
legitimacy is positive and at low levels of the moderator variables the 
link is negative.
The results for group identification and self-esteem are in 
Figures 4 and 5, respectively. One significant positive interaction 
emerged between identification and subjective status (Figure 4a). 
The positive marginal effect of subjective status is weaker at low 
levels of identification and non-significant at the lowest levels of 
identification (Figure 4b). It is stronger and significant at high levels. 
This interaction is in the direction predicted by the hypothesis; how-
ever, the effect of subjective status is never significantly negative. 
Because this effect is not negative, it is only partially consistent with 
the full prediction that perceived legitimacy will be higher for low 
status than for high status groups among lower identifiers.
Self-esteem, however, did not significantly interact with subjec-
tive status (Figure 5). In short, although group identification showed 
F I G U R E  2   Estimated slopes of subjective status for each country from the multilevel model. Dots are randomly jittered horizontally to 
help show the data.
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partial support for the hypotheses in the status domain, there was 
no support for the hypothesis for self-esteem.
3.2.2 | Moderators that increase threat 
through dissonance
Inequality contribution, civil liberties, meritocracy, and inequality were 
all expected to increase the experience of threat through dissonance. If 
the hypotheses are supported, we should find negative interactions be-
tween the moderators and status, such that at high levels of the mod-
erator variables the link between status and perceived legitimacy is 
negative and at low levels of the moderator variables the link is positive.
There were no significant negative interactions between any 
of the four moderator variables expected to increase the expe-
rience of threat (Figures 6–9). In the case of civil liberties, there 
was a positive interaction between civil liberties and subjective 
status. When probing the interaction, we found that the effect 
F I G U R E  3   Correlations (above the diagonal) and density plots (below the diagonal) between primary predictor variables and the 
individual level variables. All variables were country-mean centered before calculating the correlations. Density plots for each individual 
variable are on the diagonal. ID = Group identification; SelfEst = Self-esteem; SocMob = Social mobility; ConInqu = Contribution to 
inequality; Stable = Stability of the status hierarchy
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of subjective status (Figure 7b) was positive and stronger at high 
levels of civil liberties. At lower levels of civil liberties, the effect 
of subjective status was still positive, but weaker and non-signifi-
cant. This interaction is in the opposite direction predicted by the 
hypothesis. In short, in no cases did we find support for the hy-
potheses about moderators that could increase the experience of 
threat.
3.2.3 | Structural factors as moderators
The hypotheses suggested that inequality and perceived stability of 
the social system were structural factors that might moderate the 
association between status and perceived legitimacy. In contrast to 
the hypothesis tested in the prior paragraph, one hypothesis is that 
countries with high levels of inequality will have stronger, positive 
associations between status and perceived legitimacy because it 
makes status differences more salient. We did not find evidence for 
this (Figure 9).
For stability, the hypothesis predicted that the link between 
status and perceived legitimacy would be negative when per-
ceived stability was high compared to low. This hypothesis would 
be supported with a negative interaction effect. This effect did 
not emerge (Figure 10a). Instead, we found the opposite interac-
tion effect (Figure 10b). Contrary to the hypothesis, the link be-
tween status and perceived legitimacy is strong and positive when 
stability is high and it is weaker or non-significant when stability 
is low.
In short, we do not find evidence that inequality may exacer-
bate status-based conflict. We also find that stability is a significant 
moderator, but in the opposite direction from that expected. It indi-
cates that stability is interpreted differently in the context of real-life 
social inequality (see also Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008), compared 
to stability that is manipulated in groups created in the lab (e.g., 
Ellemers et al., 1990). A possible interpretation of the pattern found 
in this study could be that the perception that social inequality will 
not change might be an additional reason for judging that inequality 
is unacceptable (assuming people perceive there to be inequality). At 
the same time, we note that the reliability of our stability measure 
could be improved.
F I G U R E  4   Panel A: Effects of subjective status and group identification on perceived legitimacy. Covariates are included in the model. 
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Panel B: Marginal effect of subjective status on perceived legitimacy (y-axis) across the range of 
group identification (x-axis). Panel C: Marginal effect of group identification on perceived legitimacy (y-axis) across the range of subjective 
status (x-axis). For both Panels B and C, the grey band around the slope is the 95% confidence interval. In all panels a null effect is 
highlighted with the dashed line
F I G U R E  5   Effects of subjective status and self-esteem on 
perceived legitimacy. Covariates are included in the model. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals. A null effect is highlighted with 
the dashed line
F I G U R E  6   Effects of subjective status and contributing to 
inequality on perceived legitimacy. Covariates are included in the 
model. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. A null effect is 
highlighted with the dashed line
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3.3 | Approach 2: Predictors of perceived legitimacy 
for people with low levels of subjective status
We tested the hypotheses about the predictors of perceived legiti-
macy for people with low levels of subjective status using the same 
models described and presented above. To assess whether there 
was support for the hypotheses, we first examined the main effects 
of the predictors on perceived legitimacy. This main effect analysis 
tells us whether there is an average effect across the sample. When 
there is a significant interaction between the predictor and status, 
we examine whether the predictor still has the expected effect (e.g., 
a positive effect of social mobility) for people with lower levels of 
status (regardless of the pattern for those higher in status). This will 
tell us whether the effect of the predictor is specific to people with 
low social status or sense of power.
The hypotheses predicted that people would see the system as 
more legitimate when it fulfilled a social mobility or stability related 
goal. For social mobility, there was clear support for the hypothesis. 
There was a large positive effect of social mobility, such that higher 
levels of perceived social mobility were associated with higher levels 
of perceived legitimacy (Figure 11a). This positive effect was mod-
erated by subjective status (Figure 11a), suggesting that the positive 
effect is variable across levels of subjective status. At low levels of 
subjective status (Figure 11b), perceived social mobility remained a 
significant positive predictor of perceived legitimacy. This is consis-
tent with the hypothesis.
For stability, results were not consistent with the hypothesis. 
There was a negative effect of stability on perceived legitimacy 
(Figure 10a). This negative effect was moderated by subjective 
status (Figure 10a); however, at low levels of subjective sta-
tus (Figure 10c) the effect of stability remained negative and 
significant.
In short, when people see social mobility as a possibility, people 
with low subjective status see the system as more legitimate; however, 
perceiving the system as more stable is associated with less legitimacy 
at lower levels of status, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
We also made the prediction that when personal or group inter-
ests are fulfilled, perceived legitimacy of the system is less neces-
sary. The hypotheses predicted that identification and self-esteem 
F I G U R E  7   Panel A: Effects of 
subjective status and civil liberties on 
perceived legitimacy. Covariates are 
included in the model. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. Panel B: Marginal 
effect of subjective status on perceived 
legitimacy (y-axis) across the range of civil 
liberties (x-axis). The grey band around the 
slope is the 95% confidence interval. In all 
panels a null effect is highlighted with the 
dashed line. See footnote 13 for outlier 
explanation
F I G U R E  8   Effects of subjective status and meritocracy on 
perceived legitimacy. Covariates are included in the model. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals. A null effect is highlighted with 
the dashed line
F I G U R E  9   Effects of subjective status and inequality on 
perceived legitimacy. Covariates are included in the model. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals. A null effect is highlighted with 
the dashed line. See footnote 13 for outlier explanation
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would be negatively associated with levels of perceived legitimacy 
for people with low levels of subjective status.
Inconsistent with hypotheses, there are significant positive ef-
fects of identification (Figure 4a) and self-esteem (Figure 5). To see 
whether this was consistent across people with low subjective status, 
we examined the interaction effects. The positive effect of self-es-
teem was not moderated by subjective status (Figure 5). The positive 
effect of group identification was moderated by subjective status 
(Figure 4a). Here, we find that the effect of identification is not differ-
ent from zero for people who are very low status (Figure 4c). Although 
this does not confirm the hypothesis, it is also not contrary to it.
4  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
Debates around status and perceptions of legitimacy in psychology 
are characterized by mixed findings and different theoretical foci 
from different research groups. Consistent with some past work 
(e.g., Brandt, 2013; Caricati, 2017; Caricati & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2012; 
Kraus & Callaghan, 2014; Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018; Zimmerman 
& Reyna, 2013), but inconsistent with the status-legitimacy hy-
pothesis (e.g., Henry & Saul, 2006; Jost et al., 2003), we found that 
subjective status is positively associated with perceived legitimacy. 
However, this is not our primary contribution. We sought to advance 
this debate beyond straightforward main effects by taking two 
approaches.
4.1 | Approach 1: Moderator of the association 
between subjective status and perceived legitimacy
Approach 1 examined how constructs that reduce threat, constructs 
that increase threat, and perceived structural factors may be moder-
ators of the association between status and perceived legitimacy. We 
tested eight specific moderator hypotheses and found partial sup-
port for one: the identification-moderation hypothesis (see Table 4). 
That is, the most common result was no clear support for the hy-
potheses. Sometimes the lack of support was due to non-significant 
interactions. The sensitivity analyses reported in footnotes 9, 11, and 
12 indicate that we have substantial power to detect main effects 
and interactions at the individual level. For country-level interaction 
effects, we only had sufficient power to detect large effects. In the 
cases of null results, studies with even greater statistical power may 
find evidence in support of these hypotheses, in opposition to these 
hypotheses, or for a null effect (time will tell). In many other cases, 
the lack of support was due to a significant interaction that was the 
opposite of the prediction (e.g., stability-moderator hypothesis). In 
these cases (highlighted with ✗op in Table 4), it seems less plausible 
F I G U R E  1 0   Panel A: Effects of subjective status and stability of the subjective status hierarchy on perceived legitimacy. Covariates are 
included in the model. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Panel B: Marginal effect of subjective status on perceived legitimacy (y-axis) 
across the range of stability (x-axis). Panel C: Marginal effect of stability on perceived legitimacy (y-axis) across the range of subjective status 
(x-axis). For Panels B and C the grey band around the slope is the 95% confidence interval. In all panels a null effect is highlighted with the 
dashed line
F I G U R E  11   Panel A: Effects of 
subjective status and social mobility 
on perceived legitimacy. Covariates are 
included in the model. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. Panel B: Marginal 
effect of social mobility on perceived 
legitimacy (y-axis) across the range of 
subjective status (x-axis). For Panel B, the 
grey band around the slope is the 95% 
confidence interval. In all panels a null 
effect is highlighted with the dashed line
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that the issue was a lack of statistical power. The predictive power of 
the hypotheses for moderators was essentially nil.
4.2 | Approach 2: Predictors of perceived legitimacy 
for people with lower levels of subjective status
Approach 2 examined the predictors of perceived legitimacy for 
people with low subjective status. We tested four specific hypoth-
eses about these predictors and found support for one: the social 
mobility-legitimacy hypothesis (see Table 5). Most of the predictions 
were not confirmed and, in most cases, results were opposite to the 
predicted direction. As one example, the identification-legitimacy 
hypothesis predicted a negative association for members of low 
status/power groups. Yet, we found the opposite. Some members 
of our team have started to think through this type of effect (and 
have published some findings consistent with the data in this manu-
script). As explained earlier, they have proposed that among people 
with low subjective status, identification will be positively associ-
ated with system legitimacy, especially when the system can be 
used as a vehicle for improvements to group status in the long term 
(Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2018). Our data lendsome credence 
to this hypothesis.
Although almost never in a direction supportive of the hypothe-
ses (see Table 5), we find that group identification, self-esteem, and 
beliefs in social mobility are all associated with greater perceived le-
gitimacy among people with low subjective status. In this way, we 
helped fulfill Jost’s (2017) call to better understand what leads peo-
ple who are oppressed to uphold the system.
4.3 | Strengths, limitations, and future directions
We used a design that leverages larger samples from multiple countries 
to understand how subjective status is associated with perceived legiti-
macy and related constructs. This helps us avoid low statistical power 
(Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989) and uses less-WEIRD sampling (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). That said, hardly any of the samples were 
representative, and we were not able to recruit participants from all the 
regions of the globe. Most notably, we were unable to secure data from 
the continent of Africa, and Asia is underrepresented. However, given 
the consistency of our results with those of researchers who have used 
data from even more diverse and representative samples (Brandt, 2013; 
Caricati, 2017; Caricati & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2012; Vargas-Salfate 
et al., 2018), we believe that our data provide a reasonable approximation 
at this time for the regions that we do cover. A related limitation is that 
although we report the range of Cronbach's α and r for all scales across 
countries, we have not formally tested measurement invariance (He & 
van de Vijver, 2012). It is encouraging that some of the scales we use have 
been shown to be invariant across at least some countries (e.g., Davidov & 
Coromina, 2013). Clearly, more work is needed on the social psychology 
of perceived legitimacy and its development in understudied regions; this 
future work will surely have both practical and theoretical benefits.
Many of our samples are student samples. This allowed us to 
use our resources efficiently, but necessarily implies that the sam-
ples are younger and better educated than the general population. 
Although studies on similar topics (and social psychology more 
broadly) have relied on student and non-representative samples, it 
is always possible that samples with more objectively and subjec-
tively low status people, or that deliberately recruit people from 
disadvantaged groups (e.g., homeless shelters, soup kitchens) would 
reveal different results. That being said, 34% of our sample self-re-
ported a subjective social status below the midpoint of the scale, 
indicating that our sample cannot easily be dismissed as a sample 
consisting only of people who seem themselves as high status. 
Moreover, our samples included representative (sample NLD3) and 
community samples similar to those which have been used to study 
low social status in other work (e.g., MTurk in sample USA1 was 
used in Plantinga, Krijnen, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2018; Shah, 
Shafir, & Mullainathan, 2015). Additionally, our student samples are 
from a diverse array of university types, including public and private 
universities and community colleges serving a diverse range of stu-
dents. Lastly, the main effects of status are similar to studies using 
TA B L E  4   Summary of moderation hypotheses (Approach 1) and 
whether they were supported
Moderator hypothesis
Reduce threat
Identification-moderation hypothesis ✓
Self-esteem-moderation hypothesis ✗
Increase threat through dissonance
Inequality contribution-moderation hypothesis ✗
Civil liberties hypothesis ✗op
Meritocracy hypothesis ✗
SJT inequality hypothesis ✗
Structural factors that affect threat
SIT inequality hypothesis ✗
Stability-moderator hypothesis ✗op
Note: ✓ = indicates support and partial support for the hypothesis, 
✗ = indicates no support for the hypothesis. ✗op = indicates a significant 
interaction effect in the opposite direction.
Abbreviations: SIT, Social identity theory; SJT, System justification 
theory.
TA B L E  5   Summary of predictor hypotheses (Approach 2) and 
whether they were supported
Predictor hypothesis
Social Mobility-Legitimacy Hypothesis ✓
Stability-Legitimacy Hypothesis ✗op
Identification-legitimacy hypothesis ✗
Self-esteem legitimacy hypothesis ✗op
Note: ✓ = indicates support and partial support for the hypothesis, 
✗ = indicates no support for the hypothesis. ✗op = indications a 
significant interaction effect in the opposite direction.
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representative samples (e.g., Brandt, 2013), suggesting that our find-
ings are consistent with data using other sampling techniques.
4.4 | Where to now?
Our project provides scholars with additional evidence that they can 
use to inform the direction of research on status and legitimacy.14 
This additional evidence comes in two forms. First, these hypothe-
ses were inspired by both social identity and system justification 
theories and primarily made inaccurate predictions in our study. 
This may be because the prediction was wrong, or because some 
auxiliary assumptions did not hold in our particular samples and 
measures. For example, nearly every moderator predicted to reduce 
feelings of threat or increase feelings of threat through dissonance 
were not supported. This may mean that these moderators are not 
associated with threat as expected (auxiliary assumption did not 
hold), or that threat is not a key mechanism linking status to legiti-
macy (theoretical prediction was wrong). Learning from theoretical 
failures and inaccurate predictions like these can often be more in-
formative than learning from theoretical successes (Ferguson & 
Heene, 2012; Popper, 1959).
It is also plausible that some of the inaccurate predictions (and 
perhaps most of them) can be addressed by increasing the specific-
ity of the theories and how theoretical concepts are translated into 
concrete operationalizations. For example, social identity theory has 
traditionally treated legitimacy as a moderator and used outcome 
measures such as group evaluations, allocation, and social change 
strategies. Here, we tried to extend the theory's predictions to le-
gitimacy, but did not find consistent support. This may suggest that 
social identity theory's predictions about social change strategies do 
not extend to legitimacy in a straightforward way, which may also 
help to explain the limited support for predictions derived from social 
identity theory. Recent work has therefore investigated how a social 
identity perspective can be better applied to predict system legiti-
macy (Owuamalam et al., 2019).
Second, our data provide descriptive information about the pre-
cisely estimated associations between a large number of socially and 
politically relevant variables. That is, not only did our study fail to con-
firm a number of hypotheses about status and legitimacy, but it also 
provides the relevant associations and non-associations that relevant 
theories need to explain. For example, despite expectations of both 
perspectives, a negative association between status and legitimacy 
was not found at low levels of identification. Theories need to account 
for this pattern of results. Similarly, perceived stability was associated 
with lower levels of legitimacy, despite expectations. Updates will 
need to account for this pattern of results. Although post-hoc expla-
nations are possible, we hope that theorists can build clearly specified 
models that can be used to explain the current data and to make new, 
falsifiable predictions (e.g., Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019).
4.5 | Conclusion
We started this project because we noted that there is evidence 
both consistent and inconsistent with the status-legitimacy hy-
pothesis. Our study found very little support for moderator hy-
potheses across 30 countries and several moderator variables. To 
the extent that the phenomenon predicted by the status-legitimacy 
hypothesis exists, this appears to be quite rare. That does not mean 
that people with low subjective status never see the system as rel-
atively legitimate. Our data also shed light on when this is most 
likely to be the case. We find that group identification, self-esteem, 
and beliefs in social mobility are all associated with perceived le-
gitimacy among people who are low status (as well as those with 
high status). We hope that our findings inspire scholars interested 
in this domain to pursue questions related to status and legitimacy 
to enrich our understanding of these constructs around the world.
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